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The price of a barrel of crude oil dropped from about $140 in mid-July to 
about $120 by the end of July, 2008. This sharp decline coincided with two 
pieces of news that signaled a potential easing of tensions between the United 
States and Iran. The first was the U.S. decision to send Undersecretary of State 
William Burns to attend the talks between European and Iranian nuclear nego-
tiators in Switzerland. The other was confirmation that the U.S. Department of 
State was considering establishing a limited American diplomatic presence in 
Iran in the form of an "interest section," almost 30 years after relations be-
tween the two countries were severed because of occupation of the American 
Embassy in Tehran. While the price decline may have had other causes as well, 
its timing indicates a likely connection between the two pieces of news. 
This was not the only time that news about Iran—U.S. relations coin-
cided with tangible changes in oil prices. News of the U.S. backed negotiation 
of European countries with Iran over its nuclear program in September 2006 
and a number of other occasions have been followed shortly thereafter by de-
clines in oil prices. On the other hand, escalation of tensions often has contrib-
uted to increased oil prices. For example, earlier in July when Iran tested mis-
siles capable of reaching Israel and other corners of the Middle East, the price 
of oil jumped to a new high of over $147 per barrel. In fact, some analysts see 
the impact of U.S.—Iran relations on the oil market as so important as to sug-
gest the best way to give quick relief to energy consumers around the world is 
a declaration by the U.S. that military force is not an acceptable option in its 
dispute with Iran (see, for example, Klare, 2008). Conversely, a military attack 
on Iran could substantially raise the price of oil, raising inflation and lowering 
gross domestic price (GDP) in the U.S. and most of the world economies. 
Judging by the magnitude of responses to the past news, an oil price increase 
as a result of a military attack, even if it does not turn into a broader war, could 
exceed 50 percent and keep prices over $200 per barrel for some time. 
How large are the effects of oil price changes on inflation and GDP? In 
a carefully done study, Blanchard and Gali (2007) estimate that in the 1984-
2005 period, a 10 percent increase in the price of crude oil tended to lower the 
U.S. consumer price index (CPI) by about 0.27 percent and lower GDP by 
about 0.32 percent. These effects may seem relatively small. In fact, they are  
less than one half of the corresponding effects before 1984, when the share of 
oil in production was larger, labor markets were less flexible, and monetary 
policy was less sophisticated. However, the economic impact still is not trivial. 
Summary 
About the  
Center for Global Studies 
The Center for Global Studies globalizes 
the research, teaching, and outreach    
missions of the University of Illinois at 
Urbana-Champaign. Since 2003, the  
Center has been designated as a National 
Resource Center in Global Studies under 
the Title VI grant program of the U.S. 
Department of Education. 
Globalizing Missions of the Center 
• Promote and support innovative 
research to better understand global 
issues confronting the world’s popula-
tions and identify ways to cope with 
and resolve these challenges. 
• Partner with faculty and discipli-
nary units to develop new courses and 
degree programs in global studies. 
• Facilitate deep understanding of  
the values, thinking, practices, and 
aspirations of the world’s diverse cul-
tures, and the acquisition of advanced 
language skills in Less Commonly 
Taught Languages. 
• Develop teaching resources, profes-
sional training opportunities, and 
public programs in global studies for 
researchers, educators, students,  
business leaders, media, governmen-
tal agencies, civic organizations, and 
all members of the public concerned 






For more information, please visit our 
website at: www.cgs.uiuc.edu, send an 
email to global-studies@illinois.edu, or 
call 1-217-265-5186. 
International Programs and Studies    
University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign 
No 2, September 2008 
Hadi Salehi Esfahani 
Department of  Economics 
University of  Illinois at Urbana-Champaign 
  
2        Policy Brief 
For example, based on Blanchard and Gali's estimate, the 60 to 70 percent per 
annum price rises over the past two years are responsible for about 2 percentage 
points decline in U.S. GDP growth, which has taken the economy to the verge 
of recession this year. Another 50 percent price increase in case of a military 
attack (assuming it remained contained) could reduce the GDP by a further 1.6 
percent and make a recession virtually unavoidable. The dollar equivalent of 
this reduction in GDP is almost $230 billion dollars—not at all a trivial amount. 
This is, of course, only the cost to the U.S. economy and does not include the 
cost to other countries or the cost of a military action itself. More importantly, it 
does not include the human and economic cost to ordinary Iranians.  
The effects of oil price rises on other oil importing economies in terms 
of percentage change in CPI and GDP are generally in the same range of the 
impact on the U.S. economy (Kilian, 2008). But, for oil exporting countries, the 
effect of an increase in oil prices is in fact positive, unless the price hike reflects 
a cost push rather than a demand rise. Iran, for example, stands to earn almost 
$1 billion dollars more for every dollar increase in the price of oil. However, 
when aggravation of tension between Iran and the Western powers raises the oil 
price, it entails substantial costs for Iran as well. Insurance costs rise for the 
country's imports and exports, including both oil and non-oil trade. Also, the 
U.S. and its allies are more likely to extend and intensify their economic sanc-
tions on Iran. 
The exact costs of sanctions are difficult to measure, but they are cer-
tainly non-trivial. One detailed study of the unilateral U.S. sanction on Iran esti-
mates the cost in the 1990s and early 2000s to be about one percent of GDP, or 
the equivalent of U.S. $6 billion (Torbat, 2005). Intensified sanctions that are 
supported by the EU can entail much higher costs, perhaps as much as 3 to 5 
times. In addition, if tensions lead to a military attack on Iran, then Iran may not 
be able to export its oil for a while and the costs in terms of economic resources 
and human life could be enormous. The economic costs could reach about 5-10 
percent of GDP, or $30 to $60 billion, which is a huge sum for a middle income 
country like Iran.1 For Iran, put together, these costs are likely to far outweigh 
the benefits of an increase in oil prices induced by an increase in U.S.—Iran 
tensions. 
The high costs of tensions and sanctions show that it would be best for 
everyone involved if U.S.—Iran relations were to take a less confrontational 
direction. But, the question is whether there are any feasible alternatives of this 
kind. If there are good alternatives, what are the costs and risks for each coun-
try? Should the U.S. initiate détente policies with Iran, or should it continue its 
tough stance until the Islamic Republic modifies its behavior or shows willing-
ness to take the first steps? 
Addressing these questions requires a perspective on the nature of    
tensions between the U.S. and Iran. The issues most highlighted in the news are 
the U.S. claims that Tehran supports terrorism and has been  trying to obtain 
nuclear weapons, thus threatening the vital interests of the U.S. and its allies, 
especially Israel, in the Middle East and elsewhere. However, as many analysts 
have argued convincingly, the regime in Iran is a rational actor and there are 
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1.  In the aftermath of the 1979 Islamic Revolution and Iran-Iraq war, Iran's per capita 
GDP fell by about 37 percent. By the late 1980s, the per capita income was about 50 
percent of the level that it would have been if Iran had grown at the average rate for 
developing countries. The estimated 5-10 percent decline in Iran's GDP in case of a 
military attack assumes that the attack will not turn into a major or prolonged war.  
  
deeper motives behind its policy decisions (see, for example, Takeyh, 2006). 
The leaders of Iran ultimately want to preserve their regime and enhance its in-
fluence internally and externally, especially in the Middle East. It is precisely 
the latter objective of the Iranian regime that has come into conflict with the 
economic and geopolitical interests of the U.S. to maintain its hegemonic reach 
in the region. The nature of this conflict and the two sides' responses to it are 
largely shaped by the history of U.S. interventions in Iran and the region, and by 
the process through which the Islamic Republic was established (Kinzer, 2008). 
Since its inception, the Islamic Republic has been under attack inter-
nally and externally and has sought to defend itself, sometimes using excessive 
means. At the same time, the extreme security concerns and the excesses of the 
early years after the Islamic Revolution curtailed the regime's access to high- 
quality human resources and restricted its policy options. Under those circum-
stances, the rulers of Iran used the external conflicts with Iraq and the U.S. as a 
means of  regimenting internal political actors and marshalling public support 
for the government. They also sought to build their military power and form 
alliances with opponents of the U.S. outside the country. In recent years, the 
institutions of the Islamic Republic have taken stronger root, but the regime also 
has come under greater security threats from the U.S.. In response, the Islamic 
Republic has found it imperative to assert its interests in the region more ag-
gressively.  
Acquiring nuclear technology also has become an important means of 
enhancing internal confidence and rallying Iranians behind the regime.2 This 
would not necessarily lead to a build up of a nuclear arsenal. In fact, most Ira-
nian leaders seem to understand full well that the arms race that a nuclear Iran 
might trigger in the region could destabilize the country's neighborhood and 
ultimately cost them heavily. Rather, their objective seems to be developing the 
Islamic Republic's capabilities as a regional power in order to gain respect at 
external negotiating tables as well as in internal politics. 
In this context, as McFaul, Milani, and Diamond (2006-2007) argue, 
further threats and sanctions are likely to be counter-productive in curbing the 
Islamic Republic's use of unconventional means to ensure its security and en-
hance its power. A more fruitful approach seems to be a move in the opposite 
direction: full engagement of the regime and recognition of its strengths, while 
demanding that it moves away from policies that threaten the security of other 
countries in the Middle East. The offer could consist of U.S. assistance in the 
economic and technological development of the country and recognition of Iran 
as a power that can help guarantee the security of the region in cooperation with 
its neighbors and the U.S.. Some variation of this approach could be initiated by 
the U.S. and would very likely be feasible and acceptable to Iran, given the po-
tentially significant economic and political gains to both sides. 
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2.  A similar obsession developed in Iran in the mid-twentieth century with regard to iron 
and steel technology. Even the Shah, who was wholeheartedly pro-West, seemed to believe 
Iran was being denied the "mother technology" and its economic development was suffer-
ing as a result. So, he made a deal with the Soviets, whom he viewed as enemies, to build a 
steel mill in Esfahan. The steel mill came at a high cost and was based on outdated and 
inefficient technology, but it quelled the Iranians' thirst for the technology. The parallel 
with the policy of acquiring nuclear technology in recent decades is difficult to miss. 
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